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THE POET AND HIS MUSE* 
By SIR HERBERT READ 
I 
My intention is to show how the myth or image of the Muse in art personifies 
certain stratagems of the creative imagination that enable the artist to endow 
his work with universal significance. For my evidence I shall rely on the poets rather 
than other types of artists, but I believe that the principles to be established hold 
good for all the arts. 
Let me first dispose of one ambiguity: we speak of " creation" or " origination" 
knowing full well that there is nothing new under the sun, and that no artist, within 
the limits of human comprehension, has the divine faculty of bringing a new order 
out of chaos. I have dealt with such ambiguities on another occasion, and shown in 
what sense we may say that the poet" bodies forth the forms of things unknown". 
Long usage, however, has justified the use of these metaphorical words for the process 
by means of which the poet or painter or composer of music combines into a new and 
newly significant order the images which he takes from his memory: the Muses, 
from the beginning, were the daughters of Mnemosyne, or memory. 
One further preliminary disclaimer. I shall not speculate on the mythology 
of the Muses, fascinating as this is. There were, as you know, originally the nine 
muses of classical mythology, representing, with a significance that should not be 
lost to our divided culture, the sciences as well as the arts. The concept of a single 
muse, always feminine, was already present in classical times, but her sphere, when 
not specified, was not necessarily one of the arts. With the decline of classical 
mythology the Nine Muses tended to merge into one muse, though a muse accessible 
to more than one kind of artist. Orpheus, the son of Calliope, and perhaps of Apollo, 
was to assume a special significance as the personification of the magical power of 
lyrical poetry, and is often invoked instead of the Muse. 
The classical muses were tutelary-that is to say, goddesses responsible for the 
general well-being of their respective spheres of activity rather than for the inspiration 
of individual artists. It is perhaps not too fanciful to suggest that the guardian angel 
of Christian iconography is a transformation of the classical Muse endowed with a 
similar tutelary function. In the greatest of Christian poems Beatrice appears at the 
beginning as the poet's muse: 
10 era tra color, che son sospesi, 
e donna mi chiamo beata e bella 
tal che di comandare io la richiesi. 
* An address delivered on 13th May, 1963, by Sir Herbert Read, D.S.O., M.e., Hon.Litt.D. 
(Leeds), M.A. (Edin.). to a Meeting of the Association in the Great Hall of the University. 
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" I was amongst them who are in suspense; and a Lady, so fair and blessed that 
I prayed her to command, called me." It is Beatrice who commands Virgil to guide 
Dante on his way. Inspired by Beatrice, Virgil becomes duca, signore, e maestro· 
guide, lord and master of the poeU 
But this is not exactly our modern conception of the poet's muse, nor indeed 
was it necessarily the classical tradition. Already in Plato we find two further 
implications, the first having to do with the fact that the muses were the daughters 
of Mnemosyne, or memory; the second with the supposition that to invoke their aid 
was to risk losing one's reason. 
In the dialogue named after Theaetetus, Socrates asks the young mathematician 
to imagine, for the sake of argument, that our minds contain a block of wax, which 
in this or that individual may be larger or smaller, and composed of wax that is 
comparatively pure or muddy, harder in some, softer in others, and sometimes of 
just the right consistency. This block of wax is the gift of the Muses' mother, Memory, 
and the argument proceeds to show that knowledge of reality will depend on the 
distinctness of the images recorded by the wax-it is reliable only when the wax is 
of exactly the right consistency. The Muses in this fanciful metaphor thus act as 
intermediaries between the Self and Reality: the Self cannot have any true knowledge 
of Reality 'without their aid. 
In the Ion Plato uses another metaphor, that of the magnet or loadstone. The 
Muse holds a series of rings, and through these rings her magic passes like an invisible 
force to the poets who cling to them. "One poet is suspended from one Muse, another 
from another; we call it being , possessed', but the fact is much the same, since he 
is held. And from these primary rings [the poets], others are in turn suspended, some 
attached to this one, some to that, and are filled with inspiration, some by Orpheus, 
others by Musaeus. But the majority are possessed and held by Homer. . . "2 
This is really a very deterministic theory of memory and inspiration. There 
is a divine source of wisdom-this is taken as self-evident; this wisdom is transmitted 
in a causal sequence from Jupiter and Mnemosyne to their children, the Muses, and 
from the Muses in turn to their children. Though originally reputed to be virgins 
who successfully defended their chastity, most of the Muses gradually fell from this 
state of grace. Calliope had three sons, Hymenaeus, Ialemus and Orpheus; 
Melpomene lay with the river-god Achelous and begat the Sirens; Euterpe had 
Rhesus for a son and Clio Hyacinthus. Thalia gave birth to the Corybantes; again 
Apollo was the father and he competes with Amphimarus, a musician, for the father-
ship of Linus, the son of Urania. Thamyris was the son of Erato, and Triptolemus 
of Polyhymnia. In such manner the propagation of the arts was secured. 
1 An interpretation of the significance of Beatrice in Dante's life and work is given by Charles 
Williams, The Figure of Beatrice. London, 1943. 
2 Ion, 536b . 
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From one of these children of the Muses the divine spark was transmitted to 
Homer and from Homer, the father of all poets, to the lesser epic and lyric poets. 
When the magnetic force reaches the lesser poets, they are" seized with the Bacchic 
transport, and are possessed". And this is where Socrates's famous description of 
the poet occurs, as one who" is a light and winged thing, and holy, and never able 
to compose until he has become inspired, and is beside himself, and reason is no longer 
in him ".3 
I emphasize these last words, because they describe very clearly the dichotomy 
in the inspired poet, the sense of two things, Fuhrer and Gefuhrter, leader and led. 
To make his meaning clear, Socrates gives the example of Tynnichus of Chalcis . 
.. He never composed a single poem worth recalling, save the song of praise which 
everyone repeats, well-nigh the finest of all lyrical poems, and absolutely what he 
called it, an ' Invention of the Muses'. By this example above all, it seems to me, 
the god would show us, lest we doubt, that these lovely poems are not of man or 
human workmanship, but are divine and from the gods, and that the poets are nothing 
but interpreters of the gods, each one possessed by the divinity to whom he is in 
bondage." 4 
This, then, is the classical conception of the Muse; a deity who for the occasion 
deprives a human being of his senses and uses him as the witless mouthpiece of 
divine utterance. It is not a conception that is very flattering to the poet as an 
intelligent human being, and this explains why it was possible for Plato to have a 
low opinion of the poet while retaining the highest respect for poetry. It is, of course, 
a conception that has persisted wherever the classical tradition has survived, and it is 
still possible to regard the best poets and artists of all kinds as childlike or naive 
people who inexplicably give birth to works of genius. Indeed, we may say that in a 
certain sense this has become the popular and even vulgar conception of the poet ; 
any other conception will seem relatively sophisticated. 
The Renaissance introduced a typical modification of the classical conception 
of the Muse. I shall take as my example Milton, not only because he is a great poet 
of my own tongue, but also because he was a man of great learning and in this respect 
is representative of the European Renaissance in general. 
Paradise Lost opens with an invocation to a .. Heav'nly Muse" : 
Of Man's First Disobedience, and the Fruit 
Of that forbidden Tree. . . 
Sing Heav'nly Muse, that on the secret top 
Of Oreb, or of Sinai, didst inspire 
That Shepherd, who first taught the chosen Seed, 
In the Beginning how th Heav'ns and Earth 
Rose out of Chaos: or if Sian Hill 
Delight thee more, and Siloa's Brook that flow'd 
3 Ibid., 534b. 
• Ibid., 534d. 
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Fast by the Oracle of God; I thence 
Invoke thy aid to my adventrous Song, 
That with no middle flight intends to soar 
Above th' Aonian Mount, while it pursues 
Things unattempted yet in Prose or Rhime 
And chiefly Thou 0 Spirit, that dost prefer 
Before all Temples th'upright heart and pure, 
Instruct me, for Thou know'st; Thou from the first 
Wast present, and with mighty wings outspread 
Dove-like satst brooding on the vast Abyss 
And mad'st it pregnant: What in me is dark 
Illumin, what is low raise and support; 
That to the highth of this great Argument 
I may assert Eternal Providence, 
And justifie the wayes of God to men. 
This invocation is addressed to an all-seeing power, an all-pervading spirit that 
will aid the poet in his adventurous song. By comparison with the classical Muses, 
who also were heavenly but feminine and fallible, Milton's muse is dove-like, brooding, 
as sexless as the angels. Dante's Beatrice, though an angel, disclosed when we first 
encounter her sitting in Heaven with "the ancient Rachel", has human traits, 
comparable to those of the Beatrice Dante had known on earth. Milton tells us that 
his muse is the same that had inspired the shepherd Moses on Mount Horeb, and 
later as a leader of his people on Mount Sinai. But Milton gives examples of other 
places where biblical inspiration had taken place-Sion Hill and Siloa's brook, and 
even mentions in passing, as an inferior station, the classical source of inspiration, 
the Aeonian mount, or Mount Helicon. Classical inspiration, and even biblical 
inspiration, was always associated with high places, with mountains, a tradition as 
old as Assyria and Babylon, whose Ziggurats were artificial mountains built to bring 
men nearer to the heavenly source of inspiration. But then, in conclusion, Milton 
introduces the individualistic, subjective possibility-the possibility that the Spirit 
might prefer the pure and upright heart before any geographical site. Inspiration 
does not depend on temples or holy places: it can be a direct visitation to the mind 
of man. But it remains a distinct and tutelary force and is not yet to be identified 
with human consciousness. 
The opening invocation is not, however, the only reference to the Muse in 
Paradise Lost. Book VII opens with an equally eloquent and even longer invocation, 
and this time the Heavenly Muse is identified with one of the classical Muses, Urania, 
the muse of astronomy. Milton is somewhat ambiguous in this second appeal for 
inspiration. He wants to make use of the classical conception of inspiration, but in 
order to make clear that his inspiration is divine and not secular, he chooses Urania 
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instead of Calliope, and even "the meaning, not the name". But let us look a 
little more closely at this passage in Paradise Lost: 
Descend from Heav'n Urania, by that name 
If rightly thou art call'd whose voice divine 
Following, above th'Olympian Hill I soare 
Above the flight of Pegasean wing. 
The meaning, not the Name I call: for thou 
Nor of the Muses nine, nor on the top 
Of old Olympus dwell'st, but Heav'nlie borne, 
Before the Hills appeerd, or Fountain flow'd, 
Thou with Eternal wisdom didst converse, 
Wisdom thy sister, and with her didst play 
In presence of th'Almightie Father, pleas'd 
With thy Celestial Song. Up led by thee 
Into the Heav'n of Heav'ns I have presum'd, 
An Earthlie Guest, and drawn Empyreal Aire, 
Thy tempring; with like safety guided down 
Return me to my Native Element: 
Standing on Earth, not rapt above the Pole, 
More safe I sing with mortal voice, unchang'd 
To hoarce or mute, though fall'n on evil dayes, 
On evil dayes though fall'n, and evil tongues; 
In darkness, and with dangers compast round, 
And solitude; yet not alone, while thou 
Visit'st my slumbers Nightly, or when Morn 
Purples the East: still govern thou my Song, 
Urania, and fitt audience find, though few. 
It will be seen that we have returned to the upright heart and pure, but this time the 
Muse is specific and feminine, Urania, the muse of the heavenly spheres, the sister of 
Wisdom. Then, to make quite clear that he has nothing to do with Calliope, the 
rather earthy muse of heroic poetry, the mistress of Apollo and mother of Orpheus, 
Milton bids Urania 
. . . drive farr off the barbarous dissonance 
of Bacchus and his Revellers, the Race 
Of that wilde Rout that tore the Thracian Bard 
In Rhodope, where Woods and Rocks had Eares 
To rapture, till the savage clamor dround 
Both Harp and Voice; nor could the Muse defend 
Her Son. So fail not thou, who thee implores: 
For thou art Heav'nlie, shee but an empty dreame. 
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I do not wish to discuss the various sources of inspiration indicated by the poets, 
but rather the process common to them all. Milton wishes to distinguish (and to 
claim for himself) divine inspiration as opposed to merely poetic or lyrical inspiration. 
But he still maintains the original classical conception of an external source of 
inspiration, a feminine archetype endowed with wisdom, foresight and omniscience, 
who, when appealed to, guides the poet in his epic narration, revives his memory, 
brings illumination and ensures the truth of his great argument, a "celestial 
patroness", who comes "unimplored" 
And dictates to him slumbering, or inspires 
Easy his unpremeditated verse. 
I will leave Milton as representative of the relation of the Renaissance poet to 
his Muse and turn now to the Romantic poets, in whom we find a gradual modification 
of the conception. For the sake of brevity I shall confine myself to three poets, 
Blake, Shelley and Wordsworth, and will then pass on to what might be called the 
jilting of the Muse by later poets such as Edgar Allan Poe and Paul Valery. I think 
we shall then have enough material to substantiate an hypothesis in the second part 
of this lecture. 
Blake is not a complicated case-he believed quite simply that in the act of 
writing poetry he was being dictated to by heavenly spirits, sometimes anonymous, 
sometimes recognizable as historical characters. There is not one "celestial 
patroness ", but many" angels" or " authors in Eternity". "I have written this 
Poem from immediate Dictation ", he wrote to his friend Thomas Butts (25th April, 
1803), " twelve or sometimes twenty lines at a time, without Premeditation & even 
against my Will; the Time it has taken in writing was thus render'd Non Existent, 
& an immense Poem Exists which seems to be the Labour of a long Life, all produc'd 
without Labour or Study."5 
The only point illustrated by Blake that is relevant to my purpose is the dual 
nature of this process of dictation. The poet is not possessed: he is a detached and 
passive instrument of a divine purpose. As in Milton's conception of the poet, he is 
not creative but reproductive, and what he reproduces is a vision, in which not only 
the images but also the expressive words are" given". 
Such words are given to him by miscellaneous representatives of the" Worlds 
of Eternity". The Daughters of Memory (the Muses) become the Daughters of 
Inspiration. The poem Blake called Milton opens with an invocation to these 
Daughters: 
Daughters of Beulah! Muses who inspire the Poet's Song, 
Record the journey of immortal Milton thro' yon Realms 
Of terror and mild moony lustre in soft sexual delusions 
Of varied beauty, to delight the wanderer and repose 
His burning thirst & freezing hunger! Come into my hand, 
• Poetry and Prose of William Blake. Edited by Geoffrey Keynes. London (The Nonesuch 
Press), 1927. p. 1073. 
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By your mild power descending down the Nerves of my right arm 
From out the portals of my Brain, where by your ministry 
The Eternal Great Humanity Divine planted his Paradise 
And in it caus'd the Spectres of the Dead to take sweet forms 
In likeness of himself. . . 
lSI 
The Muse in Blake becomes prophetic, which was also Plato's sense of the Muse's 
function. The only difference is that what Blake would call " vision" Plato called 
" madness" -the deity, he says, has bereft the lyric poets of their senses, "and 
uses them as ministers, along with soothsayers & godly seers ... in order that we 
listeners may know that it is not they who utter these precious revelations while their 
mind is not within them, but that it is the god himself who speaks, and through them 
becomes articulate to us ".6 Blake expressed contempt for" the Stolen and Perverted 
Writings of Homer & Ovid, of Plato & Cicero", because, he said, their writings were 
" set up by artifice against the Sublime of the Bible", 7 but his own writings make 
use of the same artifices. 
Shelley was, of course, much more directly and much more consciously indebted 
to Plato than Blake, but Shelley was a child of the Enlightenment, the first poet 
consciously of a scientific age, and though he does not surrender the special nature 
of the poetical faculty, he seeks (but does not find) an explanation of inspiration 
within the human mind, being in this respect as much a psychologist as Coleridge. 8 
Poetry, he says, "ascends to bring light and fire from those eternal regions where 
the owl-winged faculty of calculation dare not ever soar. Poetry is not like reasoning, 
a power to be exerted according to the determination of the will." He then gives 
us the beautiful metaphor of the mind in creation being " as a fading coal, which 
some invisible influence, like an inconstant wind, awakens to transitory brightness" ; 
and this power, he observes, arises from within, and " the conscious portions of our 
nature are unprophetic either of its approach or its departure". Shelley ends by 
observing that the same process takes place in the plastic and pictorial arts, but 
" the very mind which directs the hands in formation, is incapable of accounting to 
itself for the origin, the gradations, or the media of the process". 9 
In some of his poems Shelley pays conventional tribute to the Muse-Urania 
herself is invoked in Adonais. But his own conception of the source of inspiration is 
found in the" Hymn to Intellectual Beauty". There we have the abstract notion 
of an "unseen Power" "visiting This various world with an inconstant Wing As 
summer winds that creep from flower to flower", and this power is invoked as : 
6 Ion, 534d. 
Spirit of Beauty, that dost consecrate 
With thine own hues all thou dost shine upon 
Of human thought or form. 
7 Preface to Milton, op. cit., p. 464. 
8 Both poets were indebted to David Hartley (1705-57), whose Observations on Man (1749) 
has some claim to be considered as the foundation of associationist psychology. The Preface 
which Wordsworth wrote to the" Lyrical Ballads" (1800) was also influenced by Hartley. 
9 A Defence of Poetry (1821). 
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The names of " Demon, Ghost and Heaven" are dismissed as : 
Frail spells-whose uttered charm will not avail to sever, 
From all we hear and all we see, 
Doubt, chance, and mutability. 
And then the Spirit of Beauty is again invoked as alone capable of giving" grace and 
truth to life's unquiet dream". The poet relates how" while yet a boy" he had 
vowed to dedicate his powers to this" awful Loveliness", and invites this power, 
which like the truth 
Of nature on my passive youth 
Descended, 
to supply its calm to his" onward life", and bind him " to fear himself, and love all 
human kind". 
The Muse is thus depersonified and becomes an abstract force, still external in 
origin, but consecrating with its own hues all that of human thought and form it 
may shine upon. If pressed for a rational explanation of the nature of this external 
force, Shelley would have taken refuge in nescience. Poetry, he suggests, is " created 
by that imperial faculty whose throne is curtained within the invisible nature of 
man". At this point we already look forward to a psychology of the unconscious. 
I have mentioned Shelley before Wordsworth because, in the evolution of the 
theory of poetry, Wordsworth was, in spite of being the older man, less bound to the 
classical concepts, more scientifically or analytically aware of the workings of the 
unconscious-he uses the very word: 
Unconscious intercourse with beauty 
Old as creation, drinking in a pure 
Organic pleasure from the silver wreaths 
Of curling mist. 
He refers (in the" Preface to the Lyrical Ballads ") to the poet's ability to conjure 
up in himself " passions which are indeed far from being the same as those produced 
by real events, yet do more nearly resemble the passions produced by real events 
than anything which, from the motion of their own minds merely, other men are 
accustomed to feel in themselves: whence, and from practice, he has acquired a 
greater readiness and power in expressing what he thinks and feels, and especially 
those thoughts and feelings which, by his own choice, or from the structure of his own 
mind, arise in him without immediate external excitement". Wordsworth, more 
than any other English poet, conceived inspiration as an external force in Nature, 
a mana: 
the earth 
And common face of Nature spake to me 
Rememberable things ... 
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It is Nature that by "extrinsic passion" first 
Peopled the mind with forms sublime or fair 
And made me love them. 
153 
In his autobiographical poem, The Prelude, there are many passages in which he 
addresses, or invokes, a power external to himself, " Beings of the hills ", or, more 
abstractly, "Wisdom and Spirit of the Universe "-
Thou soul that art the eternity of thought 
Thou givest to forms and images a breath 
And everlasting motion. . . 
I have suggested elsewhere that Wordsworth's philosophy has many points of 
resemblance to Oriental philosophy, more particularly to Taoism, where again one 
finds the concept of an external force in nature, which the Chinese call Ch'i, which is 
not only the vital force in all art, but in a specific sense a formative agency, endowing 
the artist's work with rhythm and harmony. 
Edgar Allan Poe I mention only because his ideas, which are derived in the main 
from Shelley, passed into French poetics through Baudelaire and are finally a point 
de rep ere for the reaction represented by Paul Valery. There is nothing very original 
in the theory embodied in the three essays on poetry which Poe wrote: they have 
had such an effect on the theory of poetry because they were the first attempts to 
present from the point of view of the poet what Poe called a philosophy of composition, 
or a rationale of verse. They are the prototypes of the analytical criticism of poetry 
that has been so popular in our own time. But to explain inspiration we find only 
such vague generalities as " a sense of the Beautiful", "an immortal instinct deep 
within the spirit of man", a "struggle to apprehend the supernal Loveliness". 
He introduces, as " sole arbiter" in the choice of words, the dreary concept of Taste, 
and excludes the Intellect or the Conscience. The poetic principle is finally defined, 
"strictly and simply", as "the Human Aspiration for Supernal Beauty", and 
" the manifestation of the Principle is always found in an elevating excitement oj the 
soul" . 
Wordsworth's" Wisdom and Spirit of the Universe ", like Shelley's" imperial 
faculty curtained within the invisible nature of man", is an expression of the growing 
awareness among the Romantic poets of the unconscious as a source of inspiration, 
independent of the intellectual faculties of man. All the poets and critics of the 
early nineteenth century begin to make this distinction-Coleridge and Carlyle in 
England, Goethe and Schelling in Germany, Poe and Emerson in America, de Musset 
and Lamartine in France-all are searching towards what Carlyle called the distinction 
between artificial and natural poetry. "The artificial ", wrote Carlyle ," is the 
conscious, mechanical; the natural is the unconscious, dynamical." ... " Uncon-
sciousness is the sign of creation; consciousness at best that of manufacture."lo 
10 Essays (" Characteristics "). I owe this reference to F. C. Prescott, The Poetic Mind. 
New York, 1922. (Re-issue, Cornell University Press, 1959, p. 97.) 
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It was from such poets and essayists that Freud himself derived his concept 
of the unconscious. He relates that when he was fourteen years old he had been 
given the collected works of a German writer called Ludwig Borne, and there he had 
read an essay, written in 1823, with the arresting title" The Art of Becoming an 
Original Writer in Three Days". Freud was never to forget this essay, which 
recommended a method of free association, and Dr. Ernest Jones, Freud's biographer, 
suggests that Borne's" startling proposal" had sunk into his mind to become the 
foundation of his psycho-analytical method.H One quotation from Borne will show 
his relevance to our present enquiry: 
To be creative one must be alone, away from people, from books, and as far 
as possible, from memories. The true act of self-education lies in making oneself 
unwitting. 
Much more evidence of this kind could be quoted,12 to emphasize the gradual 
evolution of the concept of the Unconscious during the past century and a half, but 
it is now common knowledge and the point I wish to emphasize is that in the process 
the Unconscious silently usurped the place formerly occupied in the poetic process 
by the Muses. But that event has merely complicated the process for us. The Muses 
were convenient and well-defined archetypes. They had names, they were distinct 
personalities. The poet or any other kind of artist could appeal to them as to a 
mother or a mistress, and establish an objective relationship. But the Unconscious-
how is that amorphous entity to help the poet? It has been shown to be a seething 
cauldron, full of ugly shapes, a realm of warring shadows, indefinite in extent, fathom-
less in depth. It is true that it has some connection with memory, the mother of the 
Muses, and it will, under the right conditions, release some of the innumerable images 
that are stored there, "curtained within". But all that intangible riot would not 
constitute poetry, or even the basic material of poetry. The Muses were cast for a 
role of intercession with their mother: memory had nine spheres, carefully defined, 
and within each sphere the appropriate Muse had established an order-had reduced 
the confusion of memory to rhythm and harmony. It was for these formal gifts that 
the ancient poets had recourse to the Muse, and though it is always assumed that the 
. poet had to be in a condition of transport or possession to make contact with the 
Muse, what he then received was a gift of art, or order, and not one of babbling 
confusion. The classical Muse, therefore, is a dMes ex machina, the governess of an 
unruly child, and in no sense to be identified with the unconscious as such. 
Before we enquire whether the prevailing theories of the unconscious suggest 
any mental process that would correspond to the function of the Muse in poetic 
creation, I should like to bring the theories of Paul Valery into evidence. Valery, 
perhaps the most self-analytical of the great poets of our own time, seems to have 
been largely indifferent to the claims of psycho-analysis. His introspection was a 
11 Sigmund Freud: Life and Works (London, I953). Vol. I, pp. 270-r. 
12 It has been assembled by L. L. Whyte in The Unconscious before Freud, New York, 1960; 
London, 1962. 
THE POET AND HIS MUSE 155 
rigorous discipline that never deviated from the matter in hand-the nature of the 
poetic process in his own experience. In an early essay (r889) Valery paid tribute 
to Poe's" curious little work The PhilosoPhy of Composition". Himself a mathe-' 
matician and philosopher, he calls Poe "mathematician, philosopher and great 
writer ", and of Poe's essay on " the mechanics of composition" he says: 
None of his works contains more acute analysis or a more strictly logical 
development of the principles discovered by observation. It is an entirely 
a posteriori technique, based on the psychology of the listener, on the knowledge 
of the different notes that must be sounded in another's soul. Poe's penetrating 
induction insinuates itself into the reader's intimate reflections, anticipates and 
uses them. Well knowing the great part played in our mental life by habit and 
automatism, he postulates methods that since the ancients had been relegated 
to the inferior genres. He revives repetition of the same words, which, it seems, 
was an Egyptian practice. He predicts with certainly the overwhelming effect 
of a bleak refrain, or of frequent alliterations13 . . . 
In this Essay Valery was to base what he called a totally new and modern 
conception of the poet. 
He is no longer the dishevelled madman who writes a whole poem in the 
course of one feverish night; he is a cool scientist, almost an algebraist, in the 
service of a subtle dreamer. . . He will take care not to hurl on to paper every-
thing whispered to him in fortunate moments by the Muse of Free Association. 
On the contrary, everything he has imagined, felt, dreamed, and planned will be 
passed through a sieve, weighed, filtered, subjected to form, and condensed 
as much as possible so as to gain in power what it loses in length: a sonnet, 
for example, will be a true quintessence, a concentrated and distilled juice, 
reduced to fourteen lines, carefully composed with a view to a final and over-
whelming effect14. . . 
It would seem that Valery had been particularly struck by a sentence near the 
beginning of Poe's essay where, having declared his intention to demonstrate the 
nature of the poetic process from the method he himself had employed in the 
composition of "The Raven", Poe continues: 
It is my design to render it manifest that no one point in its composition is 
referable either to accident or intuition-that the work proceeded, step by step, 
to its completion with the precision and rigid consequence of a mathematical 
problem. 
We know now that Poe was not very sincere, or even truthful in what he wrote 
about his own compositions. He was a skilful plagiarist and had good reason for 
13 Collected Works in English, Vol. 7, The Art oj Poetry. New York (Bollingen Series), 
1958, p. 319. 
14 Ibid., pp. 315, 317. 
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disowning the visitations of the Muse. As for Valery, though he was to remain 
addicted to the mathematical analogy, to the pretence of a science of poetics, he 
nevertheless elaborated the scientific analogy in a very unscientific manner: 
We must despair of a clear vision in these matters. One must lull oneself 
with an image. My image of the poet is of a mind full of resources and cunning, 
feigning sleep at the imaginary centre of his yet uncreated work, the better to 
await that instant of his own power which is his prey. In the vague depths of 
his eyes all the forces of his desire, all the springs of his instinct are taut. And 
there, waiting for the chance events from which she selects her food-there, 
most obscure in the middle of the webs and the secret harps which she had 
fashioned from language, whose threads are interwoven and always vaguely 
vibrating-a mysterious Arachne, huntress muse, is on the watch.1s 
The Muse, as it were, comes in by the back door; and to her, surprisingly, 
Valery gives the name of the Self. Here is what is perhaps the key to his final state-
ment of the problem, from his essay" Concerning Le Cimetiere marin" (1933) : 
I enjoy work only as work: beginnings bore me, and I suspect everything 
that comes at the first attempt of being capable of improvement. Spontaneity, 
even when excellent or seductive, has never seemed to me sufficiently mine. 
I do not say that" I am right ", but that is how I am ... The notion of Myself 
is no simpler than that of Author: a further degree of consciousness opposes 
a new Self to a new Other.16 
Valery developed this distinction still further in a later essay-" Poetry and 
Abstract Thought" (1939), pointing to the difference that exists between our 
sensibility as a .whole and the faculty with which we elaborate a work of art. He 
quotes the well-known interchange between Mallarme and Degas (" My dear Degas, 
one does not make poetry with ideas, but with words ") and says that Mallarme 
was right. "But when Degas spoke of ideas", he continues, "he was, after all, 
thinking of inner speech or of images, which might have been expressed in words. 
But these words, these secret phrases which he called ideas, all these intentions and 
perceptions of the mind, do not make verses. There is something else, then, a 
modification, or a transformation, sudden or not, spontaneous or not, laborious 
or not, which must necessarily intervene between the thought that produces ideas-
that activity and multiplicity of inner questions and solutions-and, on the other 
hand, that discourse, so different from ordinary speech, which is verse, which is so 
curiously ordered, which answers no need unless it be the need it must itself create, 
which never speaks but of absent things or of things profoundly and secretly felt: 
strange discourse, as though made by someone other than the speaker and addressed 
to someone other than the listener. In short, it is a language within a language" P 
16 Ibid.,p .. 20. 
16 Ibid., p. 144. 
17 Ibid., pp. 63-4. 
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We are a long way from the ideal of a composition proceeding to its completion 
with the precision and rigid consequence of a mathematical problem which Valery 
had accepted as an ideal fifty years earlier. Valery's long tussle with words and 
meanings had taught him that the "state of poetry" is "completely irregular, 
inconstant, involuntary, and fragile, and that we lose it, as we find it, by accident ". 
But the same experience had also taught him (and in this he remained faithful to Poe) 
that inspiration is a private affair. The poet does not become a poet until he has 
created the state of poetry in others. A world of difference exists between the poetic 
state or emotion, even when this is creative and original, and the production of a 
work of art. 
More than once in the course of his critical expositions Valery illustrates his 
meaning by an anecdote from his own experience. On one occasion as he went along 
the street where he lived he was suddenly gripped by a rhythm that took possession 
of him and soon gave him the impression of some force outside himself. "It was as 
though someone else were making use of my living-machine. Then another rhythm 
overtook and combined with the first, and certain strange transverse relations were 
set up between these two principles. . . They combined the movement of my legs and 
some kind of song I was murmuring, or rather which was being murmured through me. 
This composition became more and more complicated and soon in its complexity 
went far beyond anything I could reasonably produce with my ordinary, usable, 
rhythmic faculties. The sense of strangeness that I mentioned became almost 
painful, almost disquieting."1s 
This rhythmical excitement was generated by the poet's" sensibility as a whole", 
but that is not the point. It may be that such states are induced occasionally in 
all of us: the poet is the exceptional individual who can make use of such states 
in a practical way, the way of versification. 
What Valery effected in his poetics was in fact almost a reversal of the traditional 
conception of the Muse. In the classical conception the poet was content to be a 
passive instrument, the temporary channel of some kind of supernatural communi-
cation. The poet is forced to say to himself: "In your works, my dear poet, what 
is good is not by you, and what is bad is indisputably yours." In Valery's theory 
there is " a special quality, a kind of individual energy proper to the poet. It appears 
to him and reveals him to himself at certain infinitely precious moments. But 
these are only moments, and this higher energy ... exists and can act only in brief 
fortuitous manifestations."19 And to sum up, Valery suggests that" certain instincts 
betray to us the depths where the best of us is found, but in pieces embedded in 
shapeless matter, odd or rough in appearance. We must separate these elements of 
noble metal from the mass, and take care to fuse them together and fashion some 
ornament ".20 In other words, the Muse is very unreliable, and what she offers is a 
fitful illumination of the mysteries of life. "Form alone exists-only form preserves 
18 Ibid., p. 61. 
19 Ibid., p. 213. 
20 Ibid., p. 214. 
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the works of the mind "-an assertion which Valery quotes from Mistral-and form 
is an object or event of the senses, shaped by the imagination. 
Nevertheless, in all this speculation on the nature of the poetic activity, from 
Plato to Valery, there is the sense of some self" miraculously superior to Myself". 
The poet's consciousness is in some sense divided, and can in some sense maintain 
separate activities. But occasionally a bridge is thrown across the dividing gulf, 
and at that unexpected moment a transformation takes place. For some reason 
this transformation is not a private emotion, confined to the self, but the triumph 
of life in a universe of things. 
II 
What we have so far been discussing is the problem of knowledge and inspiration 
in relation to the self, and we find ourselves involved in a paradox which has been 
formulated thus: "In the moment of knowing, which is also the real moment of 
poetic creation, the knower ceases to exist as subject at all; and, conversely, when 
he comes fully to himself, as subject, he ceases to know."21 We have seen that this 
paradox was personified in myth as the poet's Muse, an archetypal figure representing 
the memory present to the mind in that state of consciousness we call inspiration; 
a memory that fades immediately we become conscious as a self of the self. I should 
like, in this second part of my lecture, to delve a little more deeply into the psychology 
of this distinction, with special reference to the poetic process. 
The greater part of the subject-matter of psychology is devoted to a seemingly 
endless discussion of the nature of consciousness, the validity of the subjective-
objective distinction in thought, and to the problem of knowledge in general. I 
must try not to get lost in this academic wilderness. My object is the limited one of 
trying to define the conditions under which consciousness, as expressed in words, 
takes on that particular kind of concreteness we call poetic; and incidentally to 
distinguish this particular kind of concreteness in poetry from other kinds of verbal 
expression. 
I know, from personal experience supported by the evidence of other poets, that 
in the rare moments when I am writing poetry, I am in a "state of mind" totally 
distinct from the state of mind in which I composed this lecture, or am now reading 
this lecture; totally distinct, too, from the state of mind in which I go about my 
practical activities while awake-that is to say, while conscious.22 I am not so sure 
that the poetic state differs essentially from my state of mind when I am asleep and 
dreaming, but as soon as I become conscious I forget my dream, and even if, on rare 
occasions, I can recall my dream, it is in a state of mind now distinct from the state 
of my mind in the act of dreaming. I think we must leave the dreaming mind on 
one side; it may offer analogies to the state of mind in poetic creation, but since 
11 Owen Barfield, Poetic Diction: A Study in Meaning. London, 1928, p. 244 . 
•• I ignore the fact that many of our practical activities are habitual reflexes of which we can 
hardly be said to be "conscious". 
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writing a poem is an activity of which the poet is conscious, the dreaming mind is 
divided from the creative mind by the very faculty we wish to investigate-presence 
of mind. It is presence of mind, by which phrase I think we mean an awareness that 
the mind is functioning purposively, that distinguishes a genuine creative activity 
from a mere afflatus. Here one must guard oneself against a cultural priggishness. 
The mind is present in the writing of a good ballad or a good popular song: it is 
the mind that makes it " good" rather than crude or sentimental. But" presence" 
of mind does not mean consciousness of a self that thinks-indeed, it means rather 
the absence of any ambiguity, particularly of any confusion between conscious 
thought and subjective feeling. In writing a poem there is not a stream of feeling 
carrying words in a pre-determined direction: rather there is an autonomous verbal 
activity trying to establish a concrete form, a distinct existence, which may afterwards 
be identified (by the poet or the reader) with a feeling or state of mind. It would be 
paradoxical but nearer the truth to say that a verbal activity succeeds in presenting 
to the mind a self which the poet afterwards gratefully accepts as his own. A good 
poet is a stranger to the self he meets in his poetry. 
This suggests that before proceeding any farther we should try to define the self. 
In common usage this ubiquitous word means the rather indistinct entity present to 
introspection: we have to indulge in "self-examination" to make ourselves aware 
of the characteristics of our self. Phrases like " I am not feeling myself today", 
or " I was beside myself with rage", show that the self is something that tends to 
play hide-and-seek with consciousness-presence of a self is not identical with presence 
of mind. 
To define the "self" has been one of the main preoccupations of modern 
psychology, certainly one of Jung's main preoccupations. One of Dr. Jung's last 
works has the title The Undiscovered Self. But Jung found it necessary to use this 
word in two distinct senses, sometimes distinguishing one of them by the use of a 
capital letter. 
Psycho-analysis, as a theory and a therapy, rests on the hypothesis of a divided 
mind-part conscious, part unconscious. These two divisions of the mind are not 
necessarily in opposition to each other-Jung preferred to call their relation" com-
pensatory". They complement one another to form a totality, which Jung called 
the self. Though the ideal presented by psycho-analysis is one of unity or integration, 
or at any rate of equilibrium, it is impossible, as Jung says, " to form a clear picture 
of what we are as a self, for in this operation the part would have to comprehend the 
whole. There is little hope of our ever being able to reach even approximate con-
sciousness of the self, since however much we may make conscious there will always 
exist an indeterminate and indeterminable amount of unconscious material which 
belongs to the totality of the self."23 
Jung believed that the unconscious part of the self contains all the forces that 
are necessary for the self-regulation of the psyche as a whole. The more we succeed 
23 Collected Works, Vol. 7 (Two Essays on Analytical Psychology), s. 274. 
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in bringing into the open the personal motivations that are hidden in the unconscious, 
the more we shall be able to recognize these motivations for what they are (we say 
" selfish ") and as a consequence participate freely in the wider world of objective 
interests. This" wider consciousness" is defined as " a function of relationship to 
the world of objects, bringing the individual into absolute, binding, and indissoluble 
communion with the world at large ".24 
J ung then introduces a further distinction-that between the persona, the ideal 
picture of a man as he thinks he should be, and the anima, the unconscious feminine 
reaction within the unconscious to this heroic concept. (In the woman the uncon-
scious masculine reaction is called the animlJ,s.) In normal life a man's anima is 
often projected, with the result that the hero, as Jung says, comes under the heel of 
his wife's slipper. But sometimes-and this is where the hypothesis becomes of 
significance for our present purposes-sometimes the anima is transformed into an 
intermediary between the conscious and the unconscious. " Through this process", 
writes Jung, "the anima forfeits the demonic power of an autonomous complex; 
she can no longer exercise the power of possession, since she is depotentiated. She is 
no longer the guardian of treasures unknovvn; no longer Kundry, demonic messenger 
of the Grail, half divine and half-animal; no longer the soul to be called' Mistress " 
but a psychological function of an intuitive nature, akin to what the primitives 
mean when they say, 'He has gone to the forest to talk with the spirits' or ' My 
snake spoke with me ' or, in the mythological language of infancy, ' A little bird told 
me '."25 
It is true that in this passage Jung does not mention the poet's Muse, but the 
application is inescapable, and in every version of the Muse that I have cited in the 
first part of this lecture, she is unmistakeably a mana-personality, " a being of some 
occult and bewitching quality (mana), endowed with magical knowledge and power ". 
Though in a parenthesis Jung identifies the mana-possessed anima with" the 
artistic temperament", he proceeds to deal with possession as evidenced in those 
whom he calls" unpoetical folk". And he is not altogether happy about the result. 
The ego becomes a mana-personality. "The masculine collective figure who now rises 
out of the dark background and takes possession of the conscious personality entails 
a psychic danger of a subtle nature, for by inflating the conscious mind it can destroy 
everything that was gained by coming to terms with the anima." The ego becomes 
"inflated ", and is in danger of delusions of superhuman power. What is desirable-
and this is what J ung meant by " integration" -is the achievement of a " mid-point" 
of the personality, " that infallible something between the opposites, or else that which 
unites them, or the result of conflict, or the product of energic tension: the coming to 
birth of personality, a profoundly individual step forward, the next stage". 26 
I would like you to hold on to this well-known concept mana, as manifested in 
the anima phenomenon, for it is undoubtedly the force we are looking for, the power of 
2. Ibid., s. 275. 
25 Ibid s. 374. 
26 Ibia:: s. 382. 
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inspiration in poetry and all other creative arts. Our problem is to try to discover 
and describe its creative process, its mode of operation. This process may not accord 
with the psychologist's aim, which is not to make poets of us all, but balanced per-
sonalities. As Jung says, " the immediate goal of the analysis of the unconscious ... 
is to reach a state where the unconscious contents (of the mind) no longer remain 
unconscious and no longer express themselves indirectly as animHs and anima 
phenomena; that is to say, a state in which anim1l.,s and anima become functions of 
relationship to the unconscious. So long as they are not this, they are autonomous 
complexes, disturbing factors that disrupt conscious control and act like true 
'disturbers of the peace '."27 To use the word Jung invented, they become" com-
plexes ", and the more complexes a man has, the more he may be said to be possessed; 
and when we try to form a picture of the personality which expresses itself through its 
complexes we must admit (says Jung) that" it resembles nothing so much as an 
hysterical woman-i.e. the anima!" Which corresponds to Plato's description 
of the poet as a man seized with the Bacchic transport, as one possessed. When a 
man has got to the roots of his complexes, and in this way rid himself of his possession, 
Jung says that the anima phenomenon comes to a stop. Which is to say, the poet 
ceases to be poetic. 
But Jung then admits that this is merely the logic of the situation. In certain 
cases the mana remains at the disposal of the ego; and then you get your supermen, 
your geniuses. He mentions Napoleon and Laotzu, but he might have mentioned 
Shakespeare or Goethe. Such people are to be called mana-personalities, and they 
represent an archetype that has taken shape in the human psyche: the hero, the 
priest and (though Jung does not say so in this particular context) the poet. 
The only question that remains is how do these exceptional people control the 
flow of their mana: how do they avoid falling victims to its destructive forces? 
What powers in the ego mediate between possession and self-possession? 
Jung's answer is: by means of the self, a " something" "poised between two 
world-pictures and their darkly discerned potentialities", "something" that is 
" strange to us and yet so near, wholly ourselves and yet unknowahle, a virtual centre 
of so mysterious a constitution that it can claim anything-kinship with beasts and 
gods, with crystals and with stars-without moving us to wonder, without even 
exciting our disapprobation", a voice that" it is surely wiser to listen to ".28 
Admittedly the self is no more than a psychological concept, " a construct that 
serves to express an unknowahle essence which we cannot grasp as such, since by 
definition it transcends our power of comprehension". It will not appeal, therefore, 
to the scientific mind, but neither, for that matter, does poetry, which also transcends 
the scientist's powers of comprehension. But as a psychological concept the self does 
offer a reasonable explanation of those processes of poetic inspiration and creation 
which hitherto have found expression only in mythological terms. You may say 
27 Ibid., s, 387. 
28 Ibid., s. 398. 
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that in substituting psychology for mythology we are merely sUbstituting one kind of 
picture-language for another kind of picture-language. That should not deter us : 
the self has no known limits and art has no known limits, and to discuss their relation-
ship is inevitably to indulge in speculation. 
Our aim is nevertheless practical, and what is produced by the poet is something 
concrete, a poem. I think we must therefore pursue our enquiry a little further, to 
ask by what process does a man possessed produce an object or event of the senses 
that is concrete, "the form alone which commands and survives" (Valery). If we 
identify (as I think we must) the Muse with the anima, how does this Muse mediate 
between the demonic power at her command and the order or equilibrium upon 
which the self depends for its existence? The tutelary Muse" governs" the Poet's 
song so that the form commands the assent of an audience, creates in them a " state 
of poetry". It is not such a mystery that we are capable of dreaming or day-
dreaming: but by what means does such a fortuitous activity become purposive 
and effective? 
Jung says that it is very difficult for a man to distinguish himself from his anima, 
but that seems to be precisely what the Poet does in the act of composition. To 
appreciate this fact we must return to the difficult concept of consciousness. 
Again I must renounce any attempt to define consciousness-psychology, as a 
subject, has been concerned with little else, and its conclusions are in the main 
negative. It may be that the immediate content of consciousness is "always a 
particular state of the brain ",29 but long ago William James showed that even this 
elementary fact could not be asserted with any sureness. " Whenever I try to become 
sensible of my thinking activity as such, what I catch is some bodily fact, an inlpression 
coming from my brow, or head, or throat, or nose. It seems as if consciousness as an 
inner activity were rather a postulate than a sensibly given fact, the postulate, namely, 
of a knower as correlative to all this known ... "30 His statement, at the conclusion 
of his Psychology, that psychology consists of " a string of raw facts; a little gossip 
and wrangle about opinions; a little classification and generalization on the mere 
descriptive level; a strong prejudice that we have states of mind, and that our brain 
conditions them: but not a single law in the sense in which physics shows us laws, 
not a single proposition from which any consequence can causally be deduced"-
all this remains true seventy or more years since James wrote the words. Almost 
exactly two centuries earlier John Locke had defined consciousness as" the perception 
of what passes in a man's own mind" ; that is to say, the presence of the self to itself, 
the ground of personal identity. This remained the accepted notion of consciousness 
until James pointed out that consciousness is not static, but a process in time-he 
described it as a " stream ", a metaphor that was to have incalculable consequences 
for psychology and for art. James was already aware that" states of mind" are by 
no means clearly apprehensible if distinguished from their objects-consciousness is 
always consciousness of something-" the thoughts themselves are the thinkers" . _ 
29 Sir Russell Brain, The Nature of Experience. London, 1959, p. 64-
so Psychology, London, 1892, p. 467. 
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" it thinks". Phenomenology is a philosophy based on the presumed identity of 
consciousness and object. Existentialism is an attempt to objectify the self so that 
it can become an object of consciousness-we dam the stream with barriers to make us 
aware of its flow. The most effective of such barriers are works of art. A work of 
art is a moment of arrest in the stream of consciousness: a feature of the work of art 
that distressed Bergson.31 The artist has no philosophical doubts: his difficulty is 
to arrest the stream at a significant moment. This" moment" we can call an 
"image ". 
Consciousness, says Sartre, is always intentional. That is to say, we become 
conscious of an object in the course of an action, in order to situate that object in our 
pursuit of Being. Consciousness is therefore a creative (or perhaps one could say a 
" concretive ") activity-without consciousness there would not be a world, 
mountains, rivers, tables, chairs, etc.; there would be only Being. In this sense 
there is no thing without consciousness, but there is not Nothing. Consciousness 
causes there to be things because it is itself nothing. Only through consciousness is 
there differentiation, meaning, and plurality for" Being ".32 
As I have said, I want to avoid getting lost in these definitions of consciousness. 
I shall try therefore to confine myself to what I believe to be a very practical problem-
the corruption of consciousness that results in bad art. This corruption is the key, 
not only to the distortion and loss of inspiration in the individual artist, but also to the 
decline of art in a civilization-and therefore, consequently, to the decline of that 
civilization. And that is the point of my argument: corruption of consciousness 
takes place when the Poet abandons his Muse. 
A young philosopher, with whom I generally find myself in complete sympathy, 
has pointed out that the basic premise of existentialist as opposed to classical thinking 
is " that truth is those arrangements or patterns of things which man as a purposeful 
activity has brought into being and which is therefore accessible to consciousness 
and which need not be sought out by reason ".33 The key word in this definition is 
" things" -things brought into being and therefore made accessible to consciousness. 
There is no consciousness without things and consciousness may therefore be described 
as a process of reification-a making of "things" by virtue of which we become 
conscious. If we can imagine a world without things in which nevertheless human 
beings existed, such human beings would be without consciousness, unconscious. 
The world is, however, "full of a number of things" and these enter into con-
sciousness by the normal process of perception. But things "out of this world", 
as we say-feelings, emotions, intuitions, etc.-are only brought into consciousness 
in the degree that they are reified, i.e., given" thingly " or concrete existence. The 
process of making things is, as Vico was the first to point out art: art is the creation 
of things which therewith become accessible to consciousness. We do not normally 
call everything that we make a work of art: many things we make are merely replicas 
31 Cf. Essai sur les donnees immediates de la conscience. Paris, 19II, pp. IO-4. 
32 Introduction by Hazel F. Barnes to Being and Nothingness. London, 1957, pp. xix-xx. 
33 Everett Knight, The Objective Society. London, 1959. 
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of existing things, and familiarity with things breeds an unawareness of their existence. 
But when we make a new thing to stand for a feeling, emotion or intuition hitherto 
unexpressed, then we make a work of art. An unreified feeling is what Valery 
calls the poetic state of mind and a poem is a thing that stands for this state of mind. 
The world might therefore be said to consist of poetry and prose, of things and their 
replicas. 
William James has a vivid image which beautifully illustrates this distinction. 
" When we take a general view of the wonderful stream of our consciousness, what 
strikes us first is the different pace of its parts. Like a bird's life, it seems to be 
an alternation of flights and perchings. The rhythm of language expresses this, 
where every thought is expressed in a sentence, and every sentence closed by a period. 
The resting places are usually occupied by sensorial imaginations of this sort, whose 
peculiarity is that they can be held before the mind for infinite time, and contemplated 
without changing; the places of flight are filled with thoughts of relations, static or 
dynamic, that for the most part obtain between the matters contemplated in the 
periods of comparative rest. Let us call the resting-places the 'substantive parts', 
and the places of flight the' transitive parts' of the stream of thought. "34 
Without realizing that he had sone so, James in this paragraph has defined the 
essence of the work of art-it is a resting-place in the stream of consciousness, which 
was also Bergson's definition of a work of art. But James goes on to point out that 
in normal processes of thought it is very difficult to see the " transitive" parts for 
what they really are. "Our thinking tends at all times towards some other sub-
stantive part than the one from which it has just been dislodged." But equally, in 
normal processes of thought, it is very difficult to linger on the perch: not only is the 
rush of thought so headlong that it almost brings us up at the conclusion before we can 
arrest it (James); or if we are nimble enough and do arrest it, then, says James, it 
ceases to be itself. "As a snowflake crystal caught in the warm hand is no longer a 
crystal but a drop, so, instead of catching the feeling of relation moving to its term, 
we find we have caught some substantive thing, usually the last word we were pro-
nouncing, statically taken, and with its function, tendency, and particular meaning 
in the sentence quite evaporated." But suppose that we could catch that substantive 
thing, supposing that the snowflake in all its crystalline perfection were to remain 
unchanged in our warm hand-why, then we should have caught a thing of beauty 
and a joy for ever: a work of art! 
There would be many qualifications to make about such a metaphysical repre-
sentation of the poetic process, some of which James himself makes when refuting 
what he calls" the ridiculous theory of Hume and Berkeley that we can have no 
images but of perfectly definite things". It is true that there was a school of poets 
which strove to hold on to the image in all its pristine precision-they were called 
the Imagists and I belonged to it. But the attempt was vain because, as James says, 
" every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows 
34 op. cit., p. 160. 
THE POET AND HIS MUSE 
round it. With it goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo 
of whence it came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead. The significance, 
the value, of the image is all in this halo or penumbra that surrounds and escorts it-
or rather that is fused into one with it and has become bone of its bone and flesh of its 
flesh; leaving it, it is true, an image of the same thing it was before, but making it 
an image of that thing newly taken and freshly understood."35 
Armed with these psychological insights let us now return to Valery's conception 
of the faculty with which we elaborate a work of art, " a kind of energy proper to the 
poet", and let us see whether we are now in a position to account for the persisting 
myth of a poet's Muse. 
We have seen that modern psychology has disintegrated the notion of an all-
knowing, self-knowing self. This disintegration is an empirical fact, and when, 
as in Jung's psychology, we speak of the re-integration, or "individuation ", of the 
personality, we are expressing an ideal of some sort, a state of mental equilibrium, 
desirable perhaps from the point of view of sanity or morality, but not necessarily 
consistent with the" Bacchic transport" of a poet, with the experience of inspiration. 
It may be that from the point of view of the poet's audience the experience of poetry 
is desirable as catharsis: that was Aristotle's point of view, and it implies, as we have 
seen, that we must carefully distinguish between the process of poetry and its effects. 
For the moment we are concerned only with the process, with the creative self and 
not with the ideal social self. I am inclined to the hypothesis that there is a self that 
flies and a self that perches, and that the work of art is the state of consciousness 
at the moment of perching, the resting-place itself and therefore something distinct 
from the flight, from the so-called stream of consciousness. I call this resting-place 
the image, but only on the understanding that we define the image in concrete terms, 
and distinguish it clearly from what philosophers call universals or ideas. Art is 
an awareness of the particularity of particular things-I think all philosophers of 
art from Plato to Coleridge and Collingwood have said something of the kind. 
Particulars are bright points of vision precipitated by the stream of consciousness, 
and to the degree that these bright points are held in suspension, a " Heraclitean fire" 
(to use Gerard Manley Hopkins's phrase) redeemed from the flux, to that extent 
(even if they are no more than a verbal image or a musical chord) they are works of 
art. The poet is the redeemer of words from the" free flow"-words which may 
nevertheless be steeped in associations. 
Since the immediate data of a state of consciousness correspond with a state of 
the brain, we must ask what trigger mechanism releases any particular image from 
the brain and sends it into the stream of consciousness. To this we can only reply 
that it must be an intensification of feeling, which results in an apperception of value: 
a vague feeling-tone becomes concrete, acquires direction and is precipitated into 
consciousness as an image. But the odd thing is that the image, like the snow-crystal, 
enters consciousness fully formed, effective by reason of its form. What agency, 
35 Ibid., pp. 165-6. 
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behind consciousness, has had this formative function? That is the final and most 
significant question. 
Valery, in one of his dialogues, asks the same question through the mouth of 
Socrates: "If some Reason were to dream, standing hard, erect, her eyes armed, 
mouth shut, mistress of her lips-would not her dream be what we are now looking 
at-this world of measured forces and studied illusions ?-A dream, a dream, but all 
charged with symmetries, all order, all acts, all sequences! ... Who can tell what 
august Laws are here dreaming that they have clothed their faces with brightness and 
agreed to make manifest to mortals how the real, the unreal, and the intelligIble 
can fuse and combine, obedient to the Muses? "36 
If Reason herself were to dream " a dream of vigilance and tension" -there 
we have the hypothesis we need! But can we translate such a concept into psycho-
logical terms ? 
I think we can if we assume that the brain is not merely a storehouse of buried 
impressions (of psycho-physical correspondences) but also a system of molecular 
structures. We assume that the brain is a system of physical molecules, but I think 
we must suppose that it is also a system of mental facts or monads-that the infinite 
store of impressions fed into the brain by sensations is automatically sorted into 
Gestalten, metaphysical configurations of infinite significance and viability. If I am 
told that there is no empirical evidence of such a process taking place, I can only 
reply that perception itself is precisely this process: it is the internal" requiredness " 
thanks to which, according to the Gestalt psychologists, a coherent vision of the 
external world is possible. A work of art, as Koffka has said, is not an idle play 
of the emotions, but a means of helping us to find our place in the world-" in a 
universe that is infinitely greater than our egos". Or, as the same psychologist 
puts it, in a work of art" mere factuality is subordinated to requiredness ".37 
We thus finally come to identify the Muse with Reason-with a Reason that 
dreams in measure and order, in symmetry and rhythm. But the dream visits the 
consciousness of the poet-is perhaps called to that consciousness by the blind 
necessities of feeling or emotion. In that case why are not all our minds immaculate 
screens waiting for the impress of the Muse's images ?-or, to use Plato's metaphor, 
why are they not all blocks of wax of the right consistency? Why are great poets 
such rare mortals? 
Because, I would suggest, our mental screens are for the most part neither pure 
nor luminous. Most of us suffer from a corrupt, one might even say a defiled con-
SCIOusness. We have lost" the innocent eye", the inner eye of direct or primitive 
sensation. We realize this whenever we look at the world through a child's eyes, 
as recorded in the paintings and poems of children. We realize it too, whenever we 
36" Dance and the Soul ", trans. by Dorothy Bussy (slightly modified), London, 1951. 
Quoted from Brain, op, cit., p. 73. A more recent translation in Paul Valery, Dialogues, trans. 
by William McCausland Stewart. Collected Works, Vol. 4. New York (Bollingen Series) and 
London (Routledge & Kegan Paul), I957, p. 35· 
37" Problems in the Psychology of Art." Art: a Bryn Mawr Symosium, Bryn Mawr, 
1940, p. 272 . 
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look at the world through the eyes of a so-called" savage" (who is not so savage as 
we who conspire to destroy the human race), the savage for whom the image is more 
real than the phenomenal object, the dream more real than deliberate action, or more 
real that the purposive thought that leads to deliberate action. In effect there are 
two stages in "becoming conscious" of something, first the image, then the idea-
first we look at the burning coal, then we see the colour red. Generally speaking we 
distinguish between sensation and imagination, but we do not often realize that 
imagination can be concrete-Goethe defined art as the faculty of exact sensuous 
imagination.38 
This distinction is of profound significance for the theory of art, as perhaps 
among philosophers only Collingwood has realized. He pointed out that consciousness 
has a double object where sentience has a single one. "What we hear, for example, 
is merely sound. What we attend to is two things at once: a sound and an act of 
hearing it. The act of sensation is not present to itself, but it is present, together 
with its own sensum, to the act of attention. This is, in fact, the special significance 
of the con- in the word consciousness: it indicates a togetherness of the two things, 
sensation and sensum, both of which are present to the conscious mind."39 It 
follows that when we pass from sentience to an act of attention, of awareness or 
consciousness, the impression has changed into an idea and a new principle is estab-
lished. "Attention is focussed on one thing to the exclusion of the rest. . . Con-
sciousness, master in its own house, dominates feeling." And at this moment (the 
moment to recall James's metaphor, of rest on the perch) feeling takes form. 
Collingwood actually uses words which seem to echo William James: "Attending to 
a feeling means holding it before the mind; rescuing it from the flux of mere 
sensation, and conserving it for so long as may be necessary in order that we may take 
note of it "-in order, I would say, that we can have an image of it. 
But we must, if we are poets, hold on to this precision of the process of fixation. 
Consciousness, as Collingwood points out, is a level of thought that is not yet intellect. 
" Consciousness is thought in its absolutely fundamental and original shape." In 
that shape it does not always meet with the approval of the intellect. The intellect, 
the ego of the psycho-analysts, then becomes a censor of the imagination and from 
this fact results that corruption of consciousness which is not only an abortion of 
poetic feeling, but, as we may agree with Collingwood, a disease of the mind which 
eventually leads to the corruption of language and the decline of a civilization. 40 
I am not trying (and certainly Collingwood would not have condoned such an 
attempt) to identify imagination with sensation or art with feeling: between the 
feeling and the work of art there is a force (mana: the" energy proper to the poet ") 
38 ]ubiHiumsausgabe, Vol. 39, p. 374. 
39 op. cit., p. 206. The Principles of Art, by R. G. Collingwood. Oxford, 1938. 
40 Cf. Collingwood, ibid., p. 220: "The condition of a corrupt consciousness is not only an 
example of untruth, it is an example of evil. The detailed tracing of particular evils to this 
source by psycho-analysts is one of the most remarkable and valuable lines of investigation 
initiated by modern science, bearing the same relation to the general principles of mental hygiene 
laid down by Spinoza that the detailed enquiries of relativistic physics bear to the project for a 
• universal science' of mathematical physics as laid down by Descartes." 
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which fuses the impressions of sense into formal and significant images. Collingwood 
says that in attending to a present feeling consciousness perpetuates that feeling. 
But only by giving it form, by creating a clear and distinct image. Such images, 
in their purity, are the primary elements in poetry and in all the arts. 
When we say, as Collingwood and William James say, that consciousness is 
" absolutely autonomous", 41 we are really saying that the mind is divided into two 
fields-" a background or penumbra from which attention is withdrawn" (Colling-
wood) and an object of attention-the distinction between hearing and listening, 
between seeing and looking. The poet's creative mind is equally divided between 
sensation and attention-between hearing and seeing on the one hand and looking and 
listening on the other. His sensations he cannot control-they enter consciousness 
as "brain states", "patterns of electrical impulses, or electrical fields, of great 
complexity".42 But then they are shaped by a distinct force, the energy proper to 
the poet, Coleridge's "shaping power of the imagination". The Muse is clearly 
an archetypal figure conceived at the dawn of civilization to represent this shaping 
power, and such an archetype is still serviceable for a modern theory of poetry, for an 
adequate philosophy of art. Whence the Muse's power proceeds we must leave as a 
biological mystery-it is the mana we identify with the source of life itself, which is 
formative in its deepest recesses. To the extent that we allow our sensibility to be 
guided by this shaping power, this" dream of vigilance and tension ", and exclude all 
judgements and prejudices proceeding from the passions (which Plato called" the 
lie in the soul "43) to that extent we are true poets and worthy to receive the truth 
revealed by the Muse. 
41 Collingwood, op. cit., p. 207 . 
•• Brain, op. cit., p. 64 . 
•• Republic, 382a-c: "the falsehood in words is a copy of the affection in the soul, an 
afterrising image of it . .. " Trans. Paul Shorey. 
